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defeat to nuclear annihilation. At a practical level, it is reasonable to be concerned about future-and possibly ongoing, but still unrecognized-cases of nuclear rivalry. Given the economic condition of the former Soviet Union, financially motivated nuclear proliferation is a clear and present danger. Common traits among superpower crises may reappear in other dyads that feature nuclear weapons, so there is more than theoretical and historical interest in these confrontations.
Analysis of superpower crisis interactions, which provides a point of departure for development of a general model, unfolds in four stages. First, literature on deterrence is used to identify problems encountered in previous efforts to obtain cumulative knowledge about superpower and other rivalries. The second phase introduces the Multi-stage Threat Game (MTG), which achieves progress in two ways: the MTG overcomes the obstacles encountered by studies of deterrence and is more realistic than existing, single-phase models of superpower rivalry in crises. Third, propositions about the relative consistency of payoffs in the MTG are derived and possibilities for testing are identified. The fourth and final task is to assess the MTG's potential contribution to knowledge about crisis interactions.
Two important qualifications will prevent confusion about the purpose of this study. First, it takes the form of an argument in favour of a particular research agenda, as opposed to a completed project. Second, the evidence provided is logical rather than empirical. The objective is to offer an alternative approach toward assessment of nuclear deterrence theory using us-Soviet rivalry as an empirical base. Testing of propositions derived from the game-theoretic framework will take place at the next stage of this project.
Deterrence, Nuclear Weapons and Superpower Rivalry
Literature on nuclear deterrence is primarily speculative and focuses on the behaviour expected from nuclear antagonists faced with the prospect of mutual annihilation. By comparison, the relationship between anticipated and observed conduct receives insufficient attention. It still is unclear, for example, whether us and Soviet leaders acted according to the logic derived from standard application of deterrence theory to crises. Since this ambiguity pertains to the longest nuclear rivalry in history, it is reasonable to infer that authoritative knowledge will be even more lacking elsewhere. Given the likely future proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the past failure of non-proliferation regimes, greater understanding of deterrence in nuclear-type crises is essential.
Accumulation of knowledge about the theory of deterrence, conventionally articulated in terms of rational choice (Achen and Snidal, 1989 ), continues to face many barriers. In the empirical domain, lack of correspondence in case selection represents the most significant problem for the scientific research enterprise. In a comprehensive review of the dominant testing strategy utilized by Huth and Russett (1984 and Lebow and Stein (1987 , 1989a , 1989b ), Harvey and James (1992) identified both concept formation and measurement as key areas of difficulty, which helped to explain many of the discrepancies across case listings. Among other problems, accurate assessment of rational deterrence theory, within the context of the Huth-Russett/Lebow-Stein success/failure framework, requires specification of the challenger and defender in each case. But military-security crises often involve a series of interactions and deterrence episodes, with each side acquiring and playing both roles at various stages. Distinguishing cases of deterrence from compellence is also crucial, because crises frequently encompass both types of threats.
The problem is that isolating actions that conform to a deterrence and/or compellence encounter is often difficult to accomplish with any degree of accuracy. In addition to these two coding decisions, three others must be specified: the type of deterrent/compellent threat being used (for example, nuclear, large scale conventional war, economic, political, etc.), whether the crisis was an extended or direct deterrence/compellence encounter (or some combination of these), and finally whether the particular interaction constituted a deterrence success orfailure. Obviously, with over eighty possible combinations, case selection and coding would be difficult. As revealed by the ongoing debates, these obstacles cannot be overcome through reference to the historical record. Moreover, each research enterprise (ames, 1993)-aggregate data analysis, as applied by Huth and Russett, or structured, focused comparison (George, 1979) , as used by Lebow and Stein-manifests the problems that will face any framework that focuses on success versus failure.
.An alternative, game-theoretic approach, outlined below, focuses on strategic interaction in crises as discrete events, thus expanding the empirical domain of the inquiry and facilitating better, albeit indirect, judgment of the rationality underlying nuclear and conventional deterrence theory. Briefly, the objective is to determine whether us-Soviet crises during the Cold War had an essentially similar structure in terms of payoffs. Knowledge of the degree of consistency is important to the debate over rational deterrence because advocates of the theory argue that cases are comparable. To the extent that it is possible to identify consistent and compatible payoffs across crises, that account becomes more believable. If instead the cases appear to be rather different in structure, that would support criticism of efforts to generalize.
While this is not a direct test of rational deterrence theory, the proposed crisisbased approach offers some promise in this regard. The most important advantage is that each of the following issues becomes peripheral: coding failed versus successful deterrence, identifying challengers and defenders, differentiating deterrence from compellence, and distinguishing immediate, general and extended dimensions of the threat. The emphasis shifts to provocation and retaliation by leaders of nuclear states facing (a) direct threats to fundamental values, (b) finite time for response, and (c) high probability of involvement in military hostilities. These are the defining conditions of a foreign policy crisis , as distinct from an immediate deterrence encounter. A crisis-based approach entails a less rigid, although no less valid, set of criteria for selecting cases appropriate for testing a set of alternative propositions, derived from either conventional or nuclear deterrence and related to rational choice and coercive diplomacy more generally, that lie outside the success/failure framework (Harvey, 1995) . A more detailed defence in the approach appears in the fourth and final section.
A Multi-stage Model of Nuclear Crises
When game theory focuses on deterrence in the nuclear realm, Chicken is the conventional basis for models of crisis interaction. Brams, however, used the Cuban Missile Crisis to draw attention to the important issue of whether the preference ordering from Chicken is consistent with observed behaviour (1994: 130-138). He demonstrated that "standard" game-theoretic interpretations offer "little in the way of explanation" of how a compromise "was achieved and rendered stable in either game [Chicken or Brams's specification]." The matrix suggested by Brams reduces the emphasis on nuclear weapons and stresses tactical superiority of the United States in explaining the outcome. The most notable change with respect to preferences is that the Soviet Union's maintenance of the missiles, coupled with an air strike by the United States, is best for the latter and worst for the former.2
While the alternative vision of Cuban Missiles is compelling, Brams indirectly draws attention to an even more basic obstacle to cumulative knowledge about superpower crises: the uncertainty of measurement. In particular, the nature of payoffs is troubling, regardless of the model at issue. Are the values attached to victory, compromise, stalemate and defeat-the generic outcomes of any conflictcomparable from one case to the next? How are these values to be derived or at least estimated within certain boundaries? Without a systematic approach toward this problem, models of superpower rivalry in crisis must remain mostly speculative.
Analysis of superpower crisis interaction as a single-stage game is typical of the literature on deterrence in at least one sense: it operates on assumptions rather than evidence with respect to payoffs (Brams and Kilgour, 1987; James, 1991 James, , 1993 James and Harvey, 1992) . Of course, some of the existing studies have experimented with different functions, such as linear versus exponential, to represent hypothetical differences between the pure payoffs within the game of Chicken. An example of a linear payoff function would be 0, 1/3, 2/3 and 1 for the crisis outcomes of nuclear annihilation, defeat, compromise and victory, respectively James and Harvey, 1992). Estimation of payoffs, however, remains extremely underdeveloped in comparison to equilibrium concepts and other aspects of the game-theoretic models.
With a more realistic representation of crisis interactions in multiple stages, knowledge about the specific versus general character of payoffs comes within reach. More precisely, if actions and reactions, along with crisis outcomes, are known, it should be possible to estimate a range of payoff values that is consistent with the behaviour observed. If no such range exists, then either the payoffs must fluctuate considerably in relative value across cases or there is a weakness elsewhere in the model that produces inconsistency. Thus the MTG is intended as a step forward in two ways: (1) rather than assuming only one action per player, it allows for two; and (2) eventual intra-and inter-case analysis will permit assessment of consistency in payoffs, which represents a new way of testing whether Chicken is the appropriate metaphor with respect to nuclear rivalry.
Relative simplicity and a greater sense of reality are the dual purposes behind the rules of the MTG:
1. The game begins with a move by Row (R), followed by Column (C); each player is permitted one further move, in that order. The moves are labelled sI, tl, s2 and t2. 2. Strategies range from cooperation (si, tj = 1) to a nuclear strike (si, tj = 0). 3. The game may end sooner than two moves by each player, but only if one chooses to cooperate with the other (i.e., si = 1; tj = 1). 4. Corner payoffs are the same as in the game of Chicken on the unit square: r, < r2 < r3 < r4; C1 < C2 < C3 < C4. (1992). From this point onward the focus will be on how the MTG adapts the previous frameworks to deal with multiple stages of play. Figure 1 shows the MTG in extensive form. The game always begins with a move by Row (R). At node one, R can remain at the status quo ante or seek change, with these choices represented by sl = 1 and s, < 1, respectively. This produces either a choice for Column (C) at node two or continuation of the status quo at node three (Status Quo1). At the second node, C can either permit R to make its gain or respond in some way, represented in turn by t1 = 1 and t1 < 1. If C cooperates, the game concludes at node four, with a gain for R (GainR1) as the result. At node five R can cooperate (s2 = 1) or take some other action (s2 < 1). If R chooses cooperation, the game ends at node six with a gain for C (Gainl,). At node seven, C can move back to cooperation (t2 = 1) or take further action (t2 < 1).4 Cooperation means the end of the game at node eight, with a gain for R (GainR2); any other choice produces a new status quo at node nine (Status Quo2). Note that each player is permitted to move twice, which reflects partial relaxation of the telescoping assumption from the one-stage model of crisis interaction.
More specific attention to the choices of R and C at nodes five and seven, respectively, brings out a principal advantage of the MTG as a model of crisis interactions. Note that R, which previously had selected sl < 1, is permitted to move back from its act of coercion. The same is true of C, which started off with tl < 1. This flexibility counteracts the determinism of the single-stage telescoping assumption, which always produces an interior point of the unit square (i.e., x < 1, y < 1) as 201 S1 < 1 the outcome. The MTG, by contrast, allows for a sequence like this: non-violent military action (sl), indirect military action (t,), verbal action (s2), cooperation (t2).
Based on the scale for intensity of bargaining techniques (which will be introduced later), t1 < sI < s2 < t2. The new status quo (t2, s2) reflects C's ultimate choice of cooperation, even though, at one point, it engaged in the most coercive behaviour attributed to either player (i.e., t,).
Payoffs for R and C from a given point (x, y) on the unit square are calculated as follows:
(1) PR (x, y) = (1 -x) (1 -y)r, + (1 -x)yr2 + xyr3 + x(l -y)r4 Status QU02 (t2,s2) PR = (1 -t2)(1 -S2)rl + (1 -t2)S2r2 Table 1 shows the payoffs for R and C at each outcome within Figure 1 . This permits identification of a preference ordering for each player. Some of the comparisons are determinate. For R, either GainRl or GainR is preferred to Status Quo,, which in turn is better than Gaincl. Similarly, Gainci is preferred to Status Quol, which is better than GainRl or GainR2, for C. Table 2 lists the threshold conditions for the pairs of outcomes that are indeterminate in ordering. The expressions are simpler than might be expected on the basis of Table 1 because the minimum (rl and cl) and maximum (r4 and c4) payoffs are assumed to be 0 and 1, respectively, for each player. Since only relative distances between the pure payoffs (i.e., r,,...,r4 and c1,...,c4) are significant, 0 and 1 are convenient values to use for the boundaries of nuclear annihilation and victory (ames and Harvey, 1992; Brams and Kilgour, 1987). The crucial issue with respect to consistency will be whether ranges for r2, r3, c2 and c3 can be derived in a manner that preserves the ordering from Chicken. Tables 3 and 4 list the potential preference orderings for R and C, respectively, given the combinations among the outcomes that can be derived from Table 2 .5 As a result there are 96 possible dyads. The subgame perfect equilibrium for each scenario appears in Table 5 . Since it is very unlikely that preferences in real cases would be distributed evenly among the categories, the relative frequency of outcomes is strictly hypothetical. The percentages are as follows: Status Quo1-18.8%, Status Quo2-33.3%, GainRl-22.9%, GainR2-25% and Gaincl-0%. With perfect and complete information, it makes sense that outcomes that produce a gain for the Column player are ruled out; Row would not start the game in the first place. Thus any case in which Gaincl is the result must be explained by incomplete or imperfect information. For now the analysis will be restricted to complete and perfect information, in order to bring out some basic properties of the MTG as a vision of nuclear crisis.
Propositions and Possibilities for Testing
Suppose that Types IR and VIIIc, from Tables 3 and 4 Table 5 also produce Status Quol as the outcome, which serves as a reminder of how much remains to be learned about preferences and payoffs. In sum, it is not enough to assert that superpower crises (and nuclear confrontations in general) feature a common payoff configuration and proceed from there.
More immediately interesting is another instance, which produces an outcome different from the status quo: VR versus Ic. The subgame perfect equilibrium in this case is Status Quo2. There are a series of inequalities that must be satisfied by players of the types assumed in this game. The expressions appear in Table 2 , with three being reversed in this instance (Status Quo2 > Gaincl for VR and GainRI > GainR2 and Status Quol > Status Quo2 for Ic). Given the actions and outcome observed (Status Quo2), r2, r3, c2 and c3 must meet the over-determined conditions represented by the series of inequalities. Otherwise, the preference orderings for R and C would change, which in turn alters the process of backward induction. It is necessary, given observed data for sl, tl, s2 and t2, to produce values of r2, r3, c2 and c3 that satisfy the threshold conditions for the preference orderings.
Consider the implications for the debate over superpower rivalry. What position would advocates of rational choice and political psychology adopt on the issue of payoffs within the MTG? The concepts of existence and compatibility will be useful in bringing out crucial, and as yet unexamined, differences between these schools of thought.
Existence means that, for a given case, data on superpower actions and The points on the scale combine the coding of the relevant ICB variables, "triggering action" and "major response," and are generated by the following expression: Table 6 covers the full range of potential values for cooperation and noncooperation. There is a fixed zero point, nuclear strike, which represents the absence of cooperation. At the other extreme lies cooperation itself.13 Although the largest interval on the scale is the one separating a nuclear strike from fullscale conventional war, no qualitative difference in the range of values is assumed.14 Some specific, measurement-related advantages of the ICB data should be noted. First, every foreign policy crisis has an explicitly designated triggering act and major response, making it possible to identify circumstances in which one superpower caused the other to experience and cope with crisis conditions. Second, data sets that focus on war are less suitable for testing models like the MTG because the coding does not always distinguish the behaviour of the superpowers on an individual basis. Third, and most essential, the ICB listings include case histories and bibliographies, which make it possible to probe for potential inaccuracies prior to coding decisions. Specification of the full set of moves in each crisis ultimately will rely on at least two other sources: the Militarized Interstate Crises data set (Leng, 1993) and the series of case studies from Harvard's Pew Program. The ICB data are ideal for assessment of s, and t, but further research will be required in some cases to obtain a complete record of actions.
Since it is currently beyond the scope of this project to proceed with a data-based assessment of P1 and P2, a few cases will be explored briefly as an alternative. The Suez-Sinai Campaign and the Cuban Missile Crisis bring out some basic points related to the MTG. Although the MTG goes a step beyond single-stage models of superpower bargaining, it is possible that the telescoping of actions is still too extreme. The MTG allows for only two stages of bargaining; closer examination of superpower and other nuclear crises may suggest that it is useful to create a more nuanced version of the MTG that can account for reputations and images in enduring rivalries. In its present form, the game assumes that R's leaders would gain (GainR at node eight) if C returned to cooperation (t2 = 1) at node seven, following R's second act of aggression (s2 < 1) at node five. However, if ti < s2 (i.e., if C's initial act of aggression was more hostile than R's response) it is not clear that R's officials would be satisfied with the outcome. After all, us and Soviet leaders became virtually obsessed with image-related issues over the course of the Cold War, as clearly demonstrated in the Cuban Missile Crisis. With these considerations in mind, R would be expected to prefer a more aggressive stance in response to t, < 1 for the outcome at node eight to be considered a success. A third option for R at node five, which allows for consideration of retaliation levels, could account for such preferences while adding a new and potentially interesting twist to the extended form game. It also would allow for testing of propositions about reputation and images derived from political psychology.
Suez-Sinai produces Status

MTG, Deterrence Theory and the Legacy of Superpower Crises
Creation of the MTG permits, at least in principle, more rigorous assessment of whether superpower crises during the Cold War had an essentially similar payoff structure. As previously noted, consistency is important to the debate over rational deterrence because advocates of the theory claim that cases are comparable. If cases are different in structure, the utility of deterrence as a theory or strategy would be undermined. Critics might raise several questions about whether, in principle, the proposed alternative can be expected to outperform the dominant testing strategy. After all, how can propositions about deterrence be tested if the issues that have divided the main testing programs are avoided? The more interesting (and relevant) question, however, is this: Will propositions from deterrence theory ever be evaluated effectively if coding controversies and related issues continue to divert creative energies? Most of the disputes over case listings of deterrence encounters do not apply to identification of superpower crises; far fewer potentially controversial judgments are required about if and when officials perceived a threat to values, finite time for response, and a high probability of military hostilities. While any immediate deterrence confrontations would constitute an international crisis almost by definition, it is much more difficult to establish the identity of a specific crisis in foreign policy along dimensions such as immediate or general deterrence, and deterrence versus compellence, given previously noted difficulties with coding.
Other sceptics might question whether the new approach can account for subjective costs, benefits and probabilities on behalf of challengers and defenders. Leaders are subject to a range of forces when making foreign policy. They base subjective evaluations of costs and benefits on these considerations; utility estimates are not pulled out of thin air. A focus on strategic interaction, especially in terms of the payoffs associated with provocation and retaliation levels, can tap into factors that influence decisions about crisis escalation in a nuclear dyad. To imply otherwise entails the assumption that decisions are a product of internal psychological beliefs and intuition alone, with little connection, if any, to objective reality. If that is true, then no model (or theory) of nuclear crises should be expected to issue predictions more effectively than another. In fact, an authoritative review of crises in the twentieth century refutes the notion of idiosyncratic decision making across cases (Brecher, 1993) .
Finally, previous studies of deterrence attempt to identify the subjective costs, benefits and probability estimates of defenders and attackers through information obtained (in one form or another) from primary materials. Yet even this knowledge produces divergent interpretations of case histories, disagreement over decisionmaker's motives, perceptions and intentions, and different conclusions about deterrence as both a theory and a strategy. Although decision-making processes of the superpowers are important, observable behaviour is equally significant when evaluating deterrence or any other related theory. This is precisely why testing strategies that utilize a less rigid set of operational criteria are essential to cumulative understanding.
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Efforts to explore the nature of us-Soviet rivalry remain important for several reasons. First, demonstrating that the record of superpower activity generally supports the presence of certain strategies, and not a random distribution of actions (as implied by political psychologists), would lend credibility to the perspective of rational choice. Notwithstanding differences in culture, ideology, political system, religion, history, leadership skills, belief structures, idiosyncrasies and changes in the distribution of nuclear capabilities, it may be possible to identify a strategic rationale that guided superpower relations throughout their foreign policy crises.
Preliminary evidence, from a one-stage model James and Harvey, 1992), suggests that the superpowers responded to provocation with threats and counter-threats that actually de-escalated tensions and promoted crisis stability. This result is consistent with expectations from rational choice and nuclear deterrence theory (ames and Harvey, 1989; Harvey and James, 1992; Harvey, 1995) . Each side seemed to grasp the general requirements for crisis stability and learned vital rules of prudence.17 Despite high stress, powerful political and psychological pressures to prevail, mutual distrust and many other obstacles to cooperation in security matters, the superpowers developed patterns of restraint to manage the rivalry without crossing the threshold to war.'8 They became motivated by a series of "disaster avoidance" constraints embedded within the logic of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The gap between the value of the interests they disputed and the possible cost of war widened. This, in turn, increased the "range of manoeuvring" that promoted crisis management and de-escalation (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990: 491) . Contrary to the image of the "pathological leader," routinely depicted by political psychologists and classic pessimists like Kahn (1961) and Wohlstetter (1959) , more than just luck prevented hostilities from breaking out between the United States and the Soviet Union. Opportunities and constraints within superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence produced long-term stabiliza-
tion.19
Another important objective within this research agenda is to assess whether nuclear rivals are indeed more prone than others to exhibit patterns of rational choice and restraint. If it could be demonstrated that the threat posed by escalation causes nuclear rivals to manage crises better, and prevents disputes from spiralling out of control, those would be important discoveries, especially in the context of nuclear proliferation. Obviously the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers would not in and of itself satisfy the conditions for nuclear deterrence that prevented the superpowers from crossing the brink. Deterrence would hold only if new nuclear powers could deploy forces in a manner that satisfies the conditions stipulated by Wohlstetter (1959) .20 (Also, the destructive capability of a new nuclear power would have to be large enough to generate rules of prudence.) If a state's deployment fails to meet those criteria, then nuclear deterrence, which traditionally depends on a credible and effective second strike, would not apply. In fact, preemption in a crisis involving two new nuclear rivals would become more likely, given the incentives to launch on warning.
Although us-Soviet nuclear deterrence may appear to have functioned according to the logic derived from rational choice in general and the game of Chicken in particular, it is not obvious that proliferation would contribute to crisis stabilization in every case. Each new nuclear state would need a sophisticated C3I network, an essential component of the relatively stable superpower relationship. Until such systems are developed to accommodate prospective nuclear rivalries, the post-Cold War system is likely to become less stable as a consequence of proliferation. It appears, at least on the surface, that the only practical solution is to continue strengthening non-proliferation regimes by placing strict limits on the distribution of nuclear materials. The less appealing alternative would be to ensure that states with nuclear weapons (or those in the process of acquiring them) are provided with the right kind of weapons technology (C3I) to meet the conditions for a stable and effective deterrent. Since the superpower rivalry is the best historical guide to policy, further development and testing of the MTG is justified on both theoretical and practical grounds. 
